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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY	East Germany	REPORT	
SUBJECT	Possible Berlin Blockade	DATE DISTR.	2 February 1955
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This is UNEVALUATED Information

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE  
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
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1. Karl Reiss, chairman of the Berlin area committee of the German-Soviet Friendship Society, indicated at a committee meeting on 2 December that a new blockade of West Berlin was an imminent possibility. Everything pointed to an impending ban of the KPD, he stated. This, according to Reiss, would be the last breach of the Potsdam Agreement the Western Powers would be able to commit. Since a treaty respected by only one party was meaningless, the Soviets would withdraw their recognition of the Potsdam Agreement and thereby deprive the Western Powers of the right to remain in West Berlin.
2. When asked if the Western Powers would voluntarily evacuate Berlin, Reiss replied that they would be forced to leave. If and when the KPD were suppressed, or, at the latest, when the Paris Agreements were ratified, West Berlin would be blockaded. When it was suggested that such a step would mean war, he said that this was regarded as unlikely. The West was in no position to carry on a war at this time, and knew that the East Bloc armies near the Elbe river outnumbered those of the West. Also, France, Italy and West Germany could not be counted on for help since West Germany was still unarmed and the strong communist parties in Italy and France would make effective action difficult.
3. While members of the committee kept saying that time was on the side of the East, Reiss said, quick action would be more favorable at that moment. This action would consist of a demand for the West to evacuate Berlin within a specified period. The demand would be immediately followed by the blockade.
4. Reiss felt that the Americans would not start an airlift because it was too expensive. This time, the blockade would not only include moral pressure on the population but would be the concern of Soviet military units. Therefore, not only the traffic in goods would be prevented but also the influx of new troops to Berlin. The free use of the Autobahn would cease, and flying over East German territory would be regarded as a violation of the sovereignty of a foreign state.

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
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5. Reiss said he realized that the reaction in West Berlin would be unfavorable, but contended that a clear front must be set up in order to "clear up this little abscess". The present situation gave the West too much of a chance to commit espionage and to smuggle radio transmitters into East Germany. Reiss added that the "enemy" was well informed on the strength and position of Soviet and KVP troops. Reiss closed by saying that the political parties and mass organizations would have to work hard to enlighten the population on this matter.



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